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Abstract
Research summary: We theoretically and empirically study
the effects of legal institutions on the inclusion of arbitration
provisions in international joint venture (IJV) contracts.
Legal institutions offer a public trilateral forum to handle
interpartner disputes. However, these institutions function
differently across countries, which can impede IJV partners
from resolving disputes effectively through court systems.
Alternatively, partners can take advantage of private trilateral
resolution mechanisms in the form of arbitration. We argue
and demonstrate that differences among partners' home
country legal institutions regarding the legal traditions, as
well as the importance of procedures and costs imposed in
these countries for enforcing contracts, increase the likeli-
hood of choosing arbitration over litigation. We also com-
pare results for partners' recourse to IJV boards as a private,
bilateral means of addressing conflicts.
Managerial summary: IJVs are powerful levers for mar-
ket expansion and access to resources and capabilities.
The risks of corrosive disputes caused by conflicting inter-
ests or misunderstandings among partners are nonetheless
far from being negligible. Our study helps decision makers
and managers increase their understanding of the options
and remedies available for resolving disputes. We consider
three mechanisms in particular: public courts, arbitration,
and the board of directors. Findings show that considering
the partners' home country legal environments but also the
discrepancies between these environments is essential
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when it comes to giving preference to arbitration over
public courts. Findings also suggest that decisions related
to internal private ordering (i.e., relying on the JV board
of directors) are driven by the exchange characteristics
more than by institutional considerations.
KEYWORD S
arbitration provision, dispute resolution, institutional and legal
environment, international joint venture, transaction cost economics
1 | INTRODUCTION
National institutions critically influence the development of markets, the flow of investment, and the
organization of economic exchanges in international contexts (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, & Mitton,
2009; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). Firms operating in global markets have to consider the institu-
tional settings carefully when making investments and securing commitments from counterparties
because the costs of exchange depend not only on the transaction characteristics but also on the insti-
tutions of different countries (Coase, 1998; Williamson, 2000). Specifically, ideas originating in new
institutional economics and its cognate theoretical tradition of transaction cost economics (TCE) sug-
gest that legal institutions can help improve the efficiency of exchanges by supplying the general
rules that combine with the transaction-specific rules formulated in the agreement to set expectations
about the postcontractual behavior of exchange parties (Henisz & Williamson, 1999; North, 1990).
Insofar as “the formal and informal rules of the game” vary across home countries, exchange parties
may face risks arising from the absence of shared expectations, and the uncertainty about commit-
ments induced by contractual terms (Gaur & Lu, 2007; Greif, 2005; McMillan & Woodruff, 1999).
Parties may also remain uncertain about the competence and fairness of each other's public legal
institutions to support the efficient settlement of disagreements, and may have to devise private
mechanisms for governing complex transactions.
International joint ventures (IJVs), one of the most complex and frequently employed vehicles of
exchange in international business (IB), bring partners to work together by an incomplete contract
(Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Buckley & Casson, 1996; Contractor & Reuer, 2014). As highly special-
ized forms of exchange, they often involve partners hailing from different nations that do not share
institutional backgrounds and holding disparate expectations about the rules that guide each others'
behavior during the partnership. A robust IJV governance design anticipates disputes arising from
partners' divergent interests in the timespan in which the contract remains in force and accordingly
provides a means to restore order (Williamson, 1985). A dispute settlement machinery that can assure
efficiency and equity to all the transacting parties is therefore essential for complex exchanges such
as IJVs (Williamson, 1979). When parties foresee impediments to the dispute resolution process by
using the default option of public legal institutions (i.e., litigation in courts), they may craft specific
bilateral and trilateral mechanisms to buttress the dispute resolution capacity of their agreement
(Lin & Germain, 1998; Morris et al., 1998). In particular, these private mechanisms aim to foster
credible commitment to contractual terms while preserving amicability and continuity of the relation-
ship (Williamson, 1985). Accordingly, partners may consider the relative merits of agreeing to provi-
sions relying upon trilateral private mechanisms in the form of arbitration vis-à-vis public legal
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institutions in the event they fail to address conflicts bilaterally. It is therefore remarkable that inter-
national studies on alliance governance have not devoted systematic empirical attention to the influ-
ence of institutional discrepancies of partners' home countries on the choice of arbitration as a means
to settle possible disputes.
Arbitration offers the opportunity to engineer ex ante transparent, detailed, and commonly under-
stood rules that enable IJV partners to achieve clarity about enforcement ex post as well as mitigate
perceptions of unfairness (Bernstein, 2001; Bonn, 1972). It also serves as a means of circumventing
slow, disorganized or corrupted public courts (Leeson, 2008). The decisions awarded by an arbitrator
become enforceable internationally because they receive backing from multilateral treaties such as
the 1958 New York Convention. By contractually committing to submit any conflict unresolved
bilaterally to private trilateral adjudication, IJV partners can take advantage of the facility to appoint
mutually agreeable arbitrators and to adopt the procedural rules stipulated by an administrative arbi-
tration group (e.g., American Arbitration Association), all the while still borrowing the support of
public institutions for award enforcement (Pinkham & Peng, 2017). By selectively using such pri-
vately crafted rules and institutions to govern an exchange based on its attributes and anticipated
exchange hazards, as the discriminating alignment hypothesis of TCE suggests (Williamson, 2000),
IJV partners can gain dispute resolution efficiencies. Our study employs the theoretical framework of
new institutional economics as developed by Williamson (2000) to examine the effects of legal insti-
tutions of partners' home countries on whether partners include arbitration provisions or not in IJV
contracts for resolving potential disputes. New institutional economics suggest that the costs of eco-
nomic exchange are often not negligible, and depend on the transaction characteristics as well as the
institutions that support exchange in different national economies (Coase, 1998; Williamson, 2000).
Building on the well-established differences that exist among legal institutions across the world
(Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2003), we focus on the effects of particular char-
acteristics of legal institutions that present specific concerns to partners for the resolution of potential
disputes in IJVs. Because IJVs are both contractually defined as well as legally independent entities,
we consider variation in the legal institutions of the parents along dimensions that potentially affect
the uncertainty IJV partners face about how emergent disputes get resolved ex post. They include the
law on the books governing commerce and investment activity as well as the practice of law through
the court systems of the home countries of partners. These dimensions of national institutions jointly
influence how parties adhere to contractual terms and therefore govern their IJVs.
More specifically, we argue that because legal institutions form the bedrock on which contracts
are interpreted and enforced, asymmetries in their functioning in partners' native countries can indi-
cate potential problems in relying on public courts when disputes arise. Therefore, we propose that
differences in the legal systems of IJV partners' home countries, as well as disparities in the proce-
dures and costs involved in enforcing contracts, drive a wedge between partners' expectations about
how they can rely on legal institutions to secure fair and efficient dispute settlement and safeguard
their investments. For testing our hypotheses, we used data collected by surveying managers of JVs
established by Dutch companies. Regarding these IJVs, we obtained information about arbitration-
related provisions, transactional characteristics, and governance mechanisms supporting such
agreements.
Our study contributes in several ways to the IB literature and the alliance governance literature.
We first enrich research on disputes and settlement of disputes in alliances by considering choices
for public or private trilateral ordering for handling disputes that are not resolved bilaterally. Existing
research has mostly focused on contractual and corporate ways of alleviating and resolving disputes
(e.g., Barden, Steensma, & Lyles, 2005; Geringer & Hébert, 1989; Gong, Shenkar, Luo, & Nyaw,
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2007; Luo, 2005; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Pesch & Bouncken, 2018). The scope of our study goes
beyond these internal mechanisms and examines third-party ordering alternatives. Second, we study
the institutional conditions under which IJV partners turn to private and trilateral ordering
(i.e., arbitration) instead of public courts for dealing with bilaterally unresolved conflicts. Consistent
with the notion of institutional borrowing (Pinkham & Peng, 2017) and the “discriminating align-
ment” precept forwarded by TCE, our findings show when transacting parties tend to opt for arbitra-
tion mechanisms as opposed to public institutions to support IJV governance. In particular, in line
with our theoretical arguments, findings suggest that because countries' institutional characteristics,
and specifically divergences in them across partners' host countries, can raise the costs of IJV imple-
mentation and enforcement, they can affect the choice between arbitration and public courts. By
implication, the results of our study also help understand how a broader set of international interfirm
exchanges can rely on private and trilateral alternatives to resolve disputes (Bensaou & Anderson,
1999; Li, Xie, Teo, & Peng, 2010).
2 | THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 | Background theory
2.1.1 | Legal institutions
Legal institutions support the conditions necessary for voluntary exchange to take place by inducing
agents to commit credibly to fulfilling contractual obligations. They define the laws and regulations
that coordinate the behavior of transacting parties, and they prevent the occurrence of contractual
breaches by determining and implementing legal sanctions (Williamson, 1979). These institutions
effectively help determine the costs transacting parties bear for not adhering to the terms of the con-
tract, and they represent public ordering mechanisms authorized and administered by the state
(Hadfield, 2005). Accordingly, legal institutions enable public ordering through two complementary
mechanisms: (a) the contract law, which defines the rules of commercial engagement and enables
accurate interpretation of the contract to approximate parties' ex ante intentions; and (b) the court sys-
tem, which adjudicates on disputes related to the contract and implements appropriate remedies. We
build on the notion Williamson puts forth that institutional environments are defined by the formal
rules of the game and that it is a first-order concern for understanding how resources are allocated
and utilized in an economy (Williamson, 2000). Williamson (1979) posits that exchanges based on
incomplete contracts only occur when transacting parties share confidence in the functioning of the
dispute settlement machinery provided by the court system. While parties that belong to the same
institutional environment are less likely to possess divergent beliefs about the functioning of institu-
tional mechanisms that settle disputes, the same may not hold in an IJV context given the different
international backgrounds of the partners involved and their relatively limited knowledge about the
other partners' legal institutions. As we will discuss, these institutions are therefore anticipated to cast
a shadow on the design of governance mechanisms in IJVs and other forms of international
exchange.
The extent to which national and legal institutions can support and enforce contracts is not per-
fect. They are often constrained by many factors that make enforcement costly and render contracts
partly ineffective. Courts can enforce order efficiently when they can verify information related to
the transaction, ascertain the degree to which disputing parties have taken actions that align with con-
tractual terms, and allocate the responsibility for any performance shortfalls (Greif, 2005;
Williamson, 1985). Lacking a credible way to access and validate information material to the
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adjudication of a dispute, courts may find it difficult to make such judgments, particularly in the case
of complex transactions such as IJVs. Contract enforcement by courts may also be hindered by the
inefficiencies in the organization of the court system or by the misaligned incentives of the personnel
staffing the courts to implement the law (Leeson, 2008; McMillan & Woodruff, 2000). Also, the geo-
graphic purview of courts is limited by the boundaries of the state, beyond which their jurisdiction
and administrative capacity disappear. These limitations of public legal institutions imply that when
contracting parties cannot form congruous expectations about the cost, speed, and efficacy of resolv-
ing disputes, they may prefer private means over public institutions to achieve enforcement.
2.1.2 | Arbitration
Instead of relying on the public institutional infrastructure for enforcing contracts and handling dis-
putes, exchange parties can agree on a set of private rules and procedures when drafting their original
contract. Arbitration corresponds to a private dispute resolution mechanism in which parties have the
opportunity to define ex ante the rules for examining contractual terms, the gamut of issues that
require arbitral adjudication, the specific procedures that need to be followed, and the range of relief
that can be awarded (Leeson, 2008; Stipanowich, 2001). In the event of a breakdown of bilateral
mechanisms crafted in the contract, parties may proceed to arbitration by calling on a mutually
agreed third party to intervene and settle the dispute. Following this procedure enables contracting
parties to submit their dispute to an independent and neutral forum, typically one with expertise in
the subject matter at the center of the dispute (Bernstein, 2001). The arbitrator serves to verify the
facts and adjudicate on the dispute following the contractually agreed-upon set of transparent rules
and procedures. Compared to public legal institutions, which are encumbered by the constraints of
applying a general set of principles associated with the judicial process and its evidentiary standards
(Hylton, 2005), expert arbitrators can reach a decision regarding a particular dispute based on the
norms of fair commercial practice and trade custom (Bernstein, 1996; Domke, 1965). The expertise
of the arbitrators places them in a better position compared to public judges in interpreting parties'
intentions, and ascertaining the implied and presumed promises behind complex exchanges. Because
of its flexibility, arbitration also compares favorably to public litigation in speed and economy
(Bonn, 1972; Drahozal, 2008). These benefits largely stem from the decision of partners to legally
commit to the final settlement made by arbitrators with the losing party having little leeway to appeal
the arbitration award (Bonn, 1972).
Arbitration therefore offers several attractive features for exchange partners in IB as it enables
them to circumvent the discrepancies among their respective legal institutional frameworks. Arbitra-
tion provisions allow parties to reduce the ex ante cognitive burden of imagining the possible set of
contingencies and crafting mutually agreed responses to them. Instead, parties can lighten this burden
and reduce the associated costs by agreeing to adjust mutually to contingencies over time and rely on
arbitration in the event of any unresolved differences. Arbitration indeed relies on a set of procedures
which are independent of the legal institutions of any one of the parties' home countries. It allows
them to select a neutral arbitration institution (e.g., International Court of Arbitration, American
Arbitration Association), and partners also can choose arbitrators who are experts in both subject
matter as well as judicial process, and who are renowned for their impartiality, integrity, and fairness
(Sternlight & Resnik, 2004; Stipanowich & Lamare, 2014). It also provides IJV partners with more
leeway to decide on the language and site of dispute resolution, the applicable laws that will govern
their dispute, and the powers of the arbitral tribunal (Leeson, 2008).
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Another key feature of arbitration that is valuable in cross-country settings is the support offered
by the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(Dasgupta, 2003; Lew, 2009). Article IV of The NY Convention provides that member countries
shall recognize foreign decisions as “binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of proce-
dure of the territory where the award relied upon.” The convention stipulates that the national courts
will only review the arbitrator's decision in situations when the arbitral agreement is invalid, when a
transacting party did not have the opportunity to be heard, or when contractually agreed procedures
have not been followed (Lew, 2009; Park, 1998). Opting for arbitration therefore increases the
chance of recognition and proper enforcement of the adjudication award by the national courts of IJV
partners.
2.1.3 | Dispute resolution in IJVs
IJVs are separate legal entities established by two or more partners from different countries that share
equity and pool resources to realize mutual gains. IJV partners negotiate a contract at the outset of
their relationship, which serves as the basis for taking part in cooperative activities (see Schepker,
Oh, Martynov, and Poppo (2013) for a review). The contract not only codifies the rights, responsibil-
ities, contributions, and incentives of the partners but also specifies how partners bring order to the
relationship (e.g., Luo, 2002). From a TCE perspective, despite partners' best attempts to specify the
contract in as much detail as possible, gaps remain (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993) and disputes can
arise when partners act in ways to gain at the expense of their counterparts (Williamson, 1985). To
the extent that partners are farsighted and consider at the contracting stage potential exchange haz-
ards and conflicts during the implementation of the joint venture, they may incorporate specific inter-
nal mechanisms through which conflicts can be addressed (Luo, 2002; Mohr & Spekman, 1994;
Reuer, Klijn, & Lioukas, 2014). These steps taken at the contracting stage help forestall disputes that
may emerge in implementing the IJV (Geringer & Hébert, 1989; Killing, 1983; Lyles & Salk, 1996).
Unlike domestic collaborations in which exchange partners belong to a common institutional
environment, IJVs are formed in a cross-country context in which partners' postcontractual behaviors
are shaped by the way legal institutions in their home country implement and enforce contracts
(Baxter, 1985). The functioning of legal institutions in different countries is highly heterogeneous in
how the law is defined in the books, as well as how it is practiced when enforcing contracts. Such
discrepancies among legal institutions can influence how parties design dispute resolution mecha-
nisms at the outset and more broadly the governance of their international collaborations. Institu-
tional environments of the home countries of the partners therefore cast a shadow on the design of
IJV agreements in general (Luo, 2002). When the institutional environments of the IJV partners pos-
sess characteristics conducive for the development of common expectations and shared understand-
ing of contractual terms, IJV partners can bring order by taking advantage of bilateral control or
relational processes (Madhok, 1995). On the other hand, divergence in the institutional environments
can escalate potential threats concerning partners' adherence to contractual terms as well as con-
cerning the degree to which legal institutions can be relied upon to achieve enforcement. Accord-
ingly, parties to an IJV contract are likely to consider the economic implications of choosing the
institutional framework of one among the partners' home countries (Bhattacharya, Galpin, & Haslem,
2007; Spar, 2001).
When partners are unfamiliar with the functioning of each other's legal institutions, they may not
find it practical to resort to litigation in a given country. This is so partly because of the pitfalls asso-
ciated with navigating a foreign judicial process, and because of the potential for new disputes arising
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from an inaccurate understanding of and divergent expectations from legal institutions (Mistelis,
2004). Differences among national courts in their ways of approaching disputes set different expecta-
tions about the likely judgment about a dispute (Nunn, 2007; Oxley & Yeung, 2001). Furthermore,
foreign court judgments typically require ratification by the local court system, and differences in
legal institutions mean that the domestic courts may not ratify or may even overturn a judgment
made abroad. Winning parties have to execute the judgment through a foreign country's court system
with coercive power over the losing party (Dasgupta, 2003), a process made difficult and
unpredictable in the absence of multilateral covenants governing the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments (Paige, 2002; Roth, 2006). Given these challenges that differences in legal institu-
tions of partners' home countries generate, partners are more likely to turn to private ordering mecha-
nisms such as arbitration for a fairer, quicker, and more efficient means of resolving disputes
compared to public courts.
The decision to opt for private ordering through arbitration may be partly determined by relative
efficiency considerations. When partners can respond to institutional constraints by structuring their
IJV's governance appropriately, and by fortifying bilateral monitoring and control mechanisms, they
can still operate efficiently under the shadow of the legal institutions of their home countries
(Williamson, 1985). However, when the institutional circumstances make it costly to overcome these
limitations, they may contemplate arbitration provisions to handle disputes (Drahozal & Hylton,
2003; Eisenberg & Miller, 2007; Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2009). The choice to include arbitration provi-
sions in contracts can create some upfront costs associated with negotiating and agreeing on the pro-
cedures (Kolkey, 1988). Partners may also account for the opportunity costs associated with the
limited scope for appeal in the case of arbitration (Brousseau, Coeurderoy, & Chaserant, 2007;
Drahozal, 2005). Indeed, the presumption of continuity is much stronger in the case of arbitration rel-
ative to litigation. Arbitrators, in contrast to the adversarial positions adopted by public judges, are
more inclined to deliver compromising awards, which may not adequately safeguard against egre-
gious forms of opportunistic behavior (Eisenberg & Miller, 2007; Williamson, 1985). All of these
considerations are consistent with the discriminating alignment proposition that parties will selec-
tively rely upon arbitration as a remedial mechanism based upon the relative efficiency consider-
ations we have highlighted.
In what follows, we specify how the aforementioned merits of arbitration may lead partners to use
this private ordering arrangement relative to public legal institutions for resolving disputes. Given
that IJVs are the creation of a contract entered into by legally independent entities, we consider the
heterogeneity of legal institutions among partners' home countries along the dimensions of the law
on the books that defines the rules of commercial engagement, the functioning of courts that enforce
the contract, and the strength of protections offered to investors. More specifically, we consider dif-
ferences in the legal rules and quality of their enforcement that drive partners to consider the com-
mon set of rules and procedures that arbitration offers. Taken together, these characteristics of the
legal institutions are likely to amplify the uncertainty that partners face at the negotiation stage about
the how potential disputes are resolved ultimately via public institutions (we summarize these ideas
in Figure 1).
2.2 | Research hypotheses
2.2.1 | Legal traditions
The traditions from which the legal infrastructures of partners' home countries emerge can influence
partners' ex ante expectations about IJV dispute management in important ways. The origins of legal
DEVARAKONDA ET AL. 7
institutions affect the constitution of both substantive contract law as well as procedural law. The
contemporary legal institutional structure of most countries traces its antecedents to either civil law
(e.g., France, Spain) or common law (e.g., United States, United Kingdom) traditions (Glaeser &
Shleifer, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Licht, Goldschmidt, &
Schwartz, 2005; Spamann, 2010). These two traditions have some important differences in the prin-
ciples that recognize the establishment of a contract and bind the parties. For example, two features
of contracts in the common law tradition which are not recognized by the civil law tradition are the
doctrine of consideration which determines the binding force of a contract, and the doctrine of priv-
ity, which determines the enforceability of the contract. The doctrine of privity is a common law prin-
ciple which provides that a contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations upon any person who
is not a party to the contract. Similarly, the principle of good faith in performing contractual obliga-
tions is central to the civil law tradition but is not universally recognized in the common law tradition
(Pejovic, 2001). These differences in the substantive law and how it is interpreted may make it diffi-
cult for contracting parties from different home countries to develop common expectations and
shared understanding about each other's behavior, and about the execution of the contract.
Legal institutions also differ in matters of procedural law, which can further widen the gap
between partners from different legal traditions. The legal institutions of partners' home countries can
have differences in the extent to which they are based on statutory law and settled precedents, the
norms and standards of evidence, and the opportunity to seek superior review (Djankov et al., 2003).
Because common law is bound by precedent, how similar disputes were resolved in the past has
strong implications for how a court decides on the dispute in focus. By contrast, civil law is based on
statute and code, and it is not uncommon for courts to arrive at dissimilar conclusions in similar
cases. The two legal families also differ in the disclosure process for establishing evidence. The com-
mon law tradition tends to defend liberal discovery, according to which parties can look for evidence
to support a claim after it has been filed (Elsing & Townsend, 2002; Rubinstein, 2004). Requests for
specific documents in possession of the adverse party can be sweeping and extensive. Civil law juris-
dictions rarely permit such discovery procedures, considering them as a violation of the expectations
of confidentiality and privacy (Perlman & Nelson, 1983; Rubinstein, 2004). Given these differences
in civil law and common law traditions, IJV partners who belong to different traditions may have dif-
ferent expectations concerning the way possible disputes are likely to be addressed by intervention
through legal institutions.
To mitigate these problems, partners may prefer to opt for the arbitral forum in their contract.




Fey & Beamish, 1999;
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Trilateral mechanisms
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Pinkham & Peng, 2017)
Public institutions 
FIGURE 1 Overview of dispute
resolution mechanisms
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the contract (Franck, 2005). They can specify the institutional rules that arbitrators may follow when
adjudicating on the contract, or may even articulate private rules particularly defined for the IJV con-
tract. Unlike judges in public courts, who derive their adjudicative authority from the state, arbitrators
derive their authority from the contract and are only bound by the rules that parties have chosen to
apply to the contract. Arbitrators can dispense compromising legal formalities and apply substantive
laws that best fit a particular case. They may also use their discretion to strike a balance in the level
of detail when filing a statement of claim so that it is more elaborated for those partners accustomed
to civil law and less detailed for partners that originate from countries that adopt common law. Such
compromising practices aim to achieve a middle ground that is acceptable to both parties (Elsing &
Townsend, 2002). Arbitrators can also ask for and make use of information that may not be possible
under the evidentiary standards employed in the legal traditions of the partners. Because arbitration
allows parties to overcome problems associated with substantive and procedural law matters related
to common law and civil law, we specify the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis (H1). When the legal institutions of IJV partners' home countries belong to different
legal traditions, the partners are more likely to include arbitration provisions in the contract.
2.2.2 | Procedural uncertainty
In the previous hypothesis, we focused on the content dimension of the legal institutional infrastruc-
ture as defined by the law on the books. We now turn to the practice dimension which is characterized
by how court systems are organized in their support and maintenance of contracts between private
parties. The legal institutional structure mandates the sequence of steps parties have to go through to
resolve contractual disputes. The number of procedures that must be undertaken to enforce private
contracts serves as a good indicator for assessing the procedural uncertainty of national legal systems
(Nunn, 2007). These procedures may relate to the assignment of the case to a judge, mandatory media-
tion, the oral hearing or trial, and the court's notification of the parties that the written judgment is
available in the courthouse (Djankov et al., 2003; Spamann, 2010). A large number of procedures
increases the uncertainty of the process and makes it difficult for litigating parties to predict the out-
come (Djankov et al., 2003). Each additional procedure demands interaction between the parties them-
selves, or between them and the judge or court officer, which opens the possibility of meeting new
and emergent statutory as well as ad-hoc requirements of the legal institutional structure. These inter-
actions exacerbate uncertainty that partners face about when and how the dispute will get resolved.
The procedural flexibility of arbitration enables partners to circumvent challenges posed by exten-
sive litigation-related procedures that are found in some legal environments. Arbitration affords IJV
partners the freedom to define the contours of the dispute resolution process (Stevenson Jr., 1979).
The process of administering dispute resolution is based on the agreement between the parties. The
arbitrator, who is appointed by the parties, is in a better position than court-driven procedures to
achieve the required degree of coordination and to secure the necessary evidence. The arbitrator
together with the parties can agree on the applicable procedures to follow to fairly and efficiently
resolve the dispute. The ability to choose an arbitrator with the required procedural expertise can also
help the parties avoid procedural issues emanating from the lack of adequate human capital in the legal
institutional infrastructure (Hadfield, 2005). Because arbitration procedures are independent of the
state, and arbitrators have long-term incentives due to reputational considerations to act in a fair and
consistent manner, arbitration corresponds to a useful means of minimizing the opportunity for some
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of the more egregious kinds of procedural maneuvering (Drahozal, 2005). Arbitration also allows
overcoming the risk of corrupt judges managing cases by bribes rather than procedural rules (Bardhan,
1997). As a result, arbitration mitigates judicial inefficiencies that stem from extensive litigation-
related procedures that IJV partners can be exposed to when they collaborate. We therefore predict:
Hypothesis (H2). The higher the procedural uncertainty associated with contract enforcement in
IJV partners' home countries, the more likely the partners are to include arbitration provisions in
the contract.
2.2.3 | Litigation costs
While the extent of procedures is an appropriate predictor of the uncertainty of the administration of
judicial process, the differences in litigation costs among countries represent another indicator of the
discrepancies of legal institutional structures (Djankov et al., 2003; Nunn, 2007). Ideally, courts
should afford a convenient and relatively low-cost venue for providing the assurance that property
rights are upheld and contracts entered in private commercial exchange are enforced (North, 1990;
Olson, 1993). In countries where national court systems tend to be slow or disorganized, for instance,
delays may magnify litigation costs (Perlman & Nelson, 1983). These expected costs affect whether
IJV partners would choose to litigate, given the expected value of the settlement award (Priest &
Klein, 1984). Thus, when the costs of litigation are high, partners may choose to not rely on public
court systems to resolve disputes.
When litigation costs vary much among IJV partners' countries, arbitration offers several key
advantages over litigation in public courts. First, arbitration provides the opportunity to make
detailed arrangements regarding the allocation of costs of the arbitration proceedings or to follow the
well-developed rules of arbitral tribunals such as the ICC or UNICTRAL on the allocation of costs
(Leeson, 2008; Perlman & Nelson, 1983). By so doing, IJV partners mitigate the difficulties of antic-
ipating costs up-front. Second, arbitrators have different incentives than judges when resolving dis-
putes. Arbitrators get selected by IJV partners themselves and get paid only when they engage in
arbitration (Tullock, 1980). By contrast, judges of public courts get assigned randomly to cases and
get paid fixed salaries by the government. Hence, arbitrators compete for business and have an incen-
tive to resolve disputes efficiently (Drahozal & Hylton, 2003). Finally, the binding nature of the arbi-
tration decisions makes this resolution mechanism compare favorably to public litigation in
efficiency because national courts honor arbitration awards and are less likely to recognize the
awards of foreign courts (Bonn, 1972; Drahozal, 2008). Given the limited opportunity for appeals,
the escalation of costs is reduced. This leads us to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis (H3). The higher the litigation costs associated with contract enforcement in IJV part-
ners' home countries, the more likely the partners are to include arbitration provisions in the
contract.
2.2.4 | Protection of shareholders
The hypotheses thus far derive from the fact that an enforceable contract underpins IJV governance.
IJVs are also organizational forms that entail equity investment by each of the partners, and this
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brings another dimension of the legal institutions into focus. Specifically, the extent to which the
legal systems of partners' countries protect investors is anticipated to cast a shadow on the gover-
nance of IJVs (La Porta et al., 2000). As one example, legal institutions along with other regulatory
agencies influence the conduct of investors by setting information disclosure standards and the puni-
tive terms in the event of malfeasance. As we discuss below, variation among partners' home coun-
tries concerning investor protection is therefore relevant when considering the governance of joint
ventures.
When national legal systems of IJV partners' home countries provide a low level of investor pro-
tection, partners are likely to be apprehensive about transparent and reliable information transmission
among each other and with public authorities. IJV partners' behavior also tends to be conditioned by
the corporate norms and rules prescribed and enforced in their respective national legal environments
(Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, & Wright, 2010). In environments offering weaker protections, it is
more likely that national courts interpret respective commitments, rights and duties, and disputes at
the expense of foreign partners (Heugens, Sauerwald, Turturea, & van Essen, 2019). Such bias
against foreign firms should, in turn, encourage opportunistic behavior from incumbents and precipi-
tate disputes which require extensive fact discovery procedures, which vary from country to country
(Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2004). More generally, minority shareholders can fear that foreign judges
give an unfair advantage in the home court of a partner and can undermine confidence in judicial
remedies and make IJV partners reluctant to engage in litigation.
As a result, weaknesses in rules and sanctions about investor behavior as well as their enforce-
ment from courts and regulatory agencies are likely to encourage opportunistic behavior and poorly
discipline partner behavior (Doidge et al., 2004). Arbitration, by contrast, imposes a set of fact dis-
covery and adjudication procedures that can serve as a valuable remedy to disputes and can encour-
age cooperative behavior and continuity. In contrast to litigation, arbitration allows IJV partners the
opportunity to select impartial arbitrators to refer to when investment-related disputes require an
external forum for resolution (Sternlight & Resnik, 2004; Stipanowich & Lamare, 2014). Given the
business expertise of arbitrators, they may also be better positioned than judges to understand and
implement contractual provisions aimed at offsetting weak shareholder protection by investors in
international joint ventures (Klapper & Love, 2004). Enforcement uncertainty is also reduced given
the arbitrators' propensity to deliver more neutral awards compared to judges of national courts, so
judgments are more likely to be recognized and enforced even in weaker environments. Hence,
Hypothesis (H4). The lower the shareholders protection in IJV partners' home countries, the more
likely the partners are to include arbitration provisions in the contract.
3 | RESEARCH METHODS
3.1 | Data and sample
We tested our hypotheses using data obtained from a survey on IJV governance. To identify organi-
zations that were engaged in IJVs, we first relied on two secondary data sources, namely Thomson
Reuters' Security Data Corporation (SDC) database and the alumni database of a Dutch business
school. From SDC, we compiled a list of Dutch organizations that established one or more joint ven-
tures. We then identified potential respondents by matching this list of Dutch organizations with the
alumni contacts of the business school. We focused primarily on potential respondents who had at
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least 10 years of work experience. Due to their seniority within the organizations as well as their
broader internal networks, these respondents were well positioned to participate in our survey or to
refer us to an executive who was directly involved in joint ventures. We asked the respondents to
complete the survey for the IJV with which they were most familiar. Our approach is consistent with
prior work that relied on the SDC database as the main source for researching alliance governance
(e.g., Anand & Khanna, 2000) or as an initial source for identifying organizations cooperating in alli-
ances (e.g., Ariño, 2003).
We used key informants to collect our data for two reasons (e.g., Krishnan, Martin, &
Noorderhaven, 2006; White & Lui, 2005). First, given the lack of information on IJV contracts in
secondary data sources as well as the confidential nature of such information in general (Weber,
Mayer, & Wu, 2009), the use of key informants is an appropriate method. Second, obtaining
responses from multiple survey participants is extremely difficult in IJV research due to the staff
turnover in joint ventures and the relatively small size of such organizations (e.g., Kumar, Stern, &
Anderson, 1993). As a result, IJV governance research, and in particular research on their underlying
contracts, often relies on single key informants to obtain high-quality data (e.g., Krishnan et al.,
2006; Luo, 2002). Following this approach, we used the list of alliance managers to mobilize the
alumni network and construct the respondent pool for our survey. After eliciting individuals' interest
in participating in the survey, we approached about 11% of our respondents directly through the
alumni office. We also used the alumni database to identify senior directors who worked for the
Dutch parent company and were associated with the JV and sought their help to obtain responses
(65%). Finally, we placed cold calls to alliance managers and gathered responses in about 23% of the
cases. Comparing the distribution of arbitration provisions, we did not find any significant difference
between responses received through the alumni database and those obtained through cold calling
(χ2 = .019; p = .89).
To ensure face validity of our instrument, we performed several pretests. First, we held interviews
with three senior executives either involved in contract negotiations or in managing an IJV. Second,
we organized interviews with four leading academics with expertise on the topic of IJV governance.
As deemed necessary, we made minor modifications to the survey instrument. We distributed
664 surveys in total in the year 2008 and obtained 175 responses (26.4%), of which 116 were interna-
tional. More precisely, 58.6% of IJVs were established in Europe, 14.4% in East Asia (i.e., China,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan), 10.6% in the Middle East (i.e., Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
United Arab Emirates), 5.8% in South Asia (i.e., Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, India, Philippines,
and Indonesia), and 5.8% in South America (i.e., Brazil, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, and Chile),
3.9% of the IJVs in North America (i.e., United States), and 0.9% of the IJVs in Africa
(i.e., South Africa). Given that our hypotheses pertain to IJVs only, we excluded domestic JVs from
our sample. After accounting for responses with missing data and outlying observations, the final
sample consisted of 104 IJVs. The response rate can be attributed to the initial efforts made to iden-
tify the target population, the follow-up messages transmitted by email and phone, the motivation of
alumni to participate in a research project organized by their business school, promises of confidenti-
ality as well as access to the study's findings (e.g., Dillman, 2007).
We also performed several tests to ascertain the quality of our data. First, we assessed the respon-
dents' competence. In particular, we followed Kumar et al.'s (1993) recommendation that alliance-
specific measures of informant competency are preferable to company-specific measures. Respon-
dent profile shows that 95% of the participants had directly negotiated, managed, or evaluated the
joint venture, which indicates the competency of the survey participants.
12 DEVARAKONDA ET AL.
Second, we analyzed the potential for response bias by comparing early and late respondents
under the assumption that late respondents are more similar to nonrespondents than early respondents
are to nonrespondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). Test statistics revealed no significant differ-
ences between the temporal or sectoral distributions of early and late respondents (i.e., t value = 0.21,
n.s. and χ2 = .01, n.s., respectively). We also investigated the possibility of significant variation
across early and late respondents for all our theoretical variables in the models. These results also
indicated that our data were not affected by response bias.
Third, we adopted several procedural remedies for common method bias and also performed tests
to assess this potential problem. First, we relied on quasi-objective theoretical variables in our survey
(e.g., arbitration provisions included in IJV contracts) that did not relate to attitudes, behaviors or per-
ceptions (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Second, both our theoretical and inde-
pendent variables originate from different data sources, which reduce the possibility for common
method bias for the specifications. Third, in spite of those procedural remedies, we still investigated
common method bias by performing Harman's (1967) one-factor test. More specifically, to identify
whether a significant amount of common variance exists in the variables obtained from our survey,
we conducted an exploratory factor analysis, which revealed seven separate factors with an eigen-
value greater than one. Also, the first factor explained only 15.9% of the variance in the variables
used in the study. Further, we performed a second test for common method bias by using the general
factor covariate technique and adding the first unrotated factor as a control in the multiple regression
models (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Given that the inclusion of this factor did not change our results, we
conclude that common method bias does not account for the findings presented below.
3.2 | Measures
3.2.1 | Dependent variable
The dependent variable in our study reflects whether or not the parties agreed to arbitration in the
IJV contract. Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable, we used a probit model. Given that
in some cases we obtained multiple responses per parent organization on separate joint ventures, we
accounted for possible interdependencies by clustering observations and using robust standard errors.
3.2.2 | Independent variables
Our first explanatory variable relates to the legal traditions of the IJV partners' countries. We created
a dummy variable that equals one if the parent countries are rooted in different legal traditions
(i.e., civil vs. common law), and zero otherwise (i.e., Different legal families). To identify the legal
traditions in the countries, we relied on La Porta et al. (2000), Licht et al. (2005), Spamann (2010),
and the CIA Fact Book. In line with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Schleifer (2008) and Spamann
(2010), countries with socialist origin are assigned to civil law. Our results remain consistent when
taking the number of partners from a different legal tradition into account.
In our second hypothesis, we investigate the effects of procedural uncertainty arising from exten-
sive litigation procedures. We relied on the Doing Business indices reported since 2004 by the World
Bank. This database is widely adopted for research on IB activities (e.g., Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, &
Shleifer 2008; Klapper & Love, 2004; Nunn, 2007; Spamann, 2010). Specifically, we relied on
Djankov et al.'s (2003) measure of procedural uncertainty. This measure corresponds to the number
of legal procedures necessary for enforcing contracts. The list of procedural steps compiled for each
country traces the chronology of a commercial dispute before the relevant court. In line with our
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conceptual framework, we collected the values for this index for the set of IJV partners' home coun-
tries and took the highest of those values for computing our variable Procedural uncertainty.
In our third hypothesis, we investigate the effects of costs involved in resolving commercial dis-
putes through local courts. The World Bank database reports costs that correspond to the sum of
court costs, enforcement costs, and average attorney fees as a percentage of the claim. Similar to the
previous variable, Litigation costs were obtained by accounting for the highest litigation costs among
partners' home countries (e.g., Djankov et al., 2003).
Our fourth hypothesis is concerned with the legal protection of shareholders against corporate
insiders and other shareholders in IJV partners' countries. We used data assembled by the World
Bank (e.g., Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). The index consists of several
components covering areas such as: (a) the ability of the shareholder plaintiffs to sue directly or
derivatively for damages; (b) to hold majority shareholders and approving bodies (the Chief Execu-
tive Officer [CEO], members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable
for damages; (c) to receive payment for damages or repayment of profits; (d) to see liable share-
holders be fined and imprisoned or disqualified upon a successful claim; and (e) to make the court
void transactions causing damages to shareholder plaintiffs. We accounted for the lowest value
among IJV partners' countries (i.e., Shareholders' protection).
3.2.3 | Control variables
We included several control variables that are potentially related to our theoretical variables about
legal institutional characteristics and the propensity of partners to opt for arbitration to resolve dis-
putes. Our first set of controls capture the complexity of the collaboration (Anderson & Dekker,
2005; Sternlight & Resnik, 2004). Increasing complexity of collaboration can make it arduous for
partners to foresee future contingencies, thus increasing the likelihood of gaps and the attendant need
for expert third-party intervention such as arbitrators' intervention to fill those gaps. To control for
IJV complexity, we included variables which are related to the scope and size of IJVs. Broad scope
IJVs require partners to specify ex ante rights, obligations, or legitimate claims for an array of activi-
ties which increases the potential for gaps in contract and conflict between partners (Borys &
Jemison, 1989; Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002). We measured scope (i.e., IJV scope) by the number of
functional activities included in IJVs. We obtained this information by asking respondents about the
activities conducted under the IJV: basic research, new product or process development, testing and
getting regulatory approval, manufacturing, marketing, sales, and distribution (e.g., Li, Eden, Hitt,
Ireland, & Garrett, 2012). We controlled for the size of the IJV (i.e., IJV size) because larger ventures
naturally imply greater operational complexity (e.g., Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008).
We controlled for several other IJV characteristics that follow from the transaction cost logic.
Specifically, investments dedicated to the IJV and not easily deployable elsewhere if the IJV dis-
solves (i.e., Asset specificity) can cause hold-up problems and become a source of conflict between
partners ex post that can call for third-party intervention (Luo, 2007; Williamson, 1979). As a result
of the specificity of the assets involved and the risk for hold-up, partners may value the potential to
promote continuity of exchange and the amicable outcomes facilitated by arbitration (Macneil,
1962). To measure Asset specificity, we relied on Ariño (2001) to ask respondents their agreement to
the the following five statements, ranging from negligible to substantial (Cronbach's alpha = .71):
(a) Our investment in dedicated personnel specific to this venture; (b) Our investment in dedicated
facilities to the venture; (c) The time required to learn about our partner's style; (d) nonrecoverable
investments in equipment, people, and so on, if the venture would be dissolved; (e) the difficulty we
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would have in redeploying our people and facilities presently serving the venture to other uses if it
would be terminated. Further, per transaction cost logic, the conditions under which IJV partners
establish the contract also affect whether partners are likely to behave opportunistically. Specifically,
a contracting environment with few potential partners can expose IJV partners to contractual hazards
and hold-up concerns (Pisano, 1989; Williamson, 1985). To control for such small numbers
bargaining situations, we asked respondents to assess the number of other firms that would be inter-
ested in forming a collaborative venture with them in case the IJV would be discontinued (i.e., Small
numbers).
Concerns of opportunistic behavior because of goal conflict or knowledge misappropriation may
also derive from the extent that partners' end markets are overlapping (e.g., Oxley & Sampson,
2004). Our measure was obtained by summing three Likert-type items that assess the degree to which
the firms operate in similar (a) product markets, (b) geographic markets, and (c) customer markets
(i.e., Market overlap). Disputes and the need for third-party intervention to check opportunistic
behavior by partners may also arise when the duration of the IJV shortens the “shadow of the future”
thus weakening the self-enforcing ability of the contract (Heide & Miner, 1992). Accordingly, IJV
partners with finite or short-term contracts may opt for closed form solutions such as arbitration to
resolve conflicts (Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011; Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). We proxied for the
duration of the joint venture by creating a dummy variable for time-boundness of the IJV (i.e., JV
duration) which equals one when the contract specified a predefined length of time and zero when
the IJV spanned an indefinite period (e.g., Reuer & Ariño, 2007). Finally, the likelihood of
unforeseen contingencies destabilizing the partnership increases when partners face high environ-
mental uncertainty (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993). We adopted Kumar and Seth's (1998) measure for
environmental uncertainty and asked the respondents to indicate the degree to which the following
five external factors were predictable using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from “Not at all pre-
dictable” to “Accurately predictable”: (1) government policies and regulations, (2) customer demand,
(3) supply of raw materials and equipment, (4) competitive climate, and (5) technological trends
(Kumar & Seth, 1998). We reverse coded the scores such that greater values for these items reflect
greater uncertainty (i.e., ei, i = 1 to 5). Because these aspects of environmental uncertainty may affect
specific IJVs differently, we weighted these items based on respondents' allocation of 100 points
among the five factors regarding their importance in determining the ultimate success of the IJV
(i.e., wi, i = 1 to 5) (i.e., Environmental uncertainty). The measure of environmental uncertainty was







We also controlled for factors at the partners' level that influence the extent to which formal
mechanisms are required to govern the IJV. First, we included a variable that captures the collabora-
tive history between IJV partners because such ties may reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behav-
ior (Gulati, 1995; Poppo et al., 2008). Our variable corresponds to the number of prior relationships
formed between the IJV partners (i.e., Prior ties). Second, we controlled whether the IJV was set up
by two or more partners because IJVs involving multiple partners are more likely to experience goal
incongruence and free-riding behavior thus increasing the need for formal mechanisms and severe
sanctions (e.g., García-Canal, Valdés-Llaneza, & Ariño, 2003) (i.e., Dyadic IJV). Last, cultural dif-
ferences between partners may be related to their institutional backgrounds and also impact the
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likelihood of opting for private ordering through arbitration. We measure cultural differences
between the partners (Cultural distance) using the dimensions developed by Hofstede (1980).
Partners may also specify a detailed set of contractual safeguards, and use arbitration provisions
to address residual concerns. Although bounded rationality considerations limit the possibility of
drafting a complete contract, partners may draft detailed provisions to address ex post contingencies
and to limit their exposure to the risk of opportunistic behavior (Contractor & Reuer, 2014). To
account for the specificity with which contractual terms are designed (i.e., Contract term specificity),
we adopted a measure from Luo (2002). Contract term specificity uses a 5-point Likert scale to elicit
responses regarding how the IJV is set up and managed and how partners cooperate and bilaterally
deal with disagreements and how they terminate the IJV (Cronbach's alpha = .72). The experience of
partners in handling joint ventures may enable them to anticipate and address transactional concerns.
We thus control for the partners' joint experience of working with joint ventures (Partners' JV experi-
ence) by counting the number of joint ventures formed in a 5-year window before the focal joint ven-
ture (Sampson, 2005).
Our final set of controls captures the industry and institutional context of IJVs that can have a
bearing on the merits or drawbacks of using arbitration. We controlled for the quality of the rule of
law in the IJV's host country. Our variable corresponds to the Worldwide Governance Indicator
developed by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010) (i.e., Host country rule of
law). A related concern is “home turf” advantage that a parent might enjoy when one of the partners'
home nations also doubles up as the host for the IJV. IJV partners vulnerable to “home turf” advan-
tage to the counterparty can envision such a possibility, and craft mitigating safeguards in the con-
tract. To control for this effect, we included a dummy variable Shared parent and JV nationality that
equals one when any of the parents share nationality with the IJV and zero otherwise. Because there
is growing evidence that both trade and foreign investment activity have a strong regional dimension
that can shape partners' expectations and understandings (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004), we also
accounted for whether the IJV partners belong to the same trading block (i.e., Same trading bloc).
We relied on Arregle, Miller, Hitt, and Beamish (2013) and considered the following trading blocs:
EU, NAFTA (United States, Canada, and Mexico), MERCOSUR (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela), ASEAN (Thailand, Singapore, Viet-
nam, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, and Indonesia) and ANZCERTA (Australia and
New Zealand). We have followed previous research in grouping the various industries in our sample
into a smaller set of sectors such as agriculture and mining, transportation, manufacturing, and so
on. We further consolidated the six sectors into three broad categories namely manufacturing
(Manufacturing sector), service (Service sector), and others (omitted category) to facilitate our analy-
sis. Finally, we included Time fixed effects to capture differences in the advantages or drawbacks of
arbitration over time that may hinder or encourage arbitration (Stipanowich & Lamare, 2014).
4 | RESULTS
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables included in the model. Overall,
76.4% of the IJV contracts in our sample include arbitration provisions. It implies that partners prefer
to anticipate the likelihood of disputes that they cannot resolve either bilaterally or through public tri-
lateral mechanisms, that is, via public courts, by opting for arbitration. The highest absolute correla-
tion is .55 and the maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) is 2.3, which is well below common
thresholds that indicate multicollinearity problems.
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TABLE 2 Determinants of arbitration provisions in international joint venture (IJV) contracts
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Different legal families 1.326** 1.308** 0.838 2.620*
(0.440) (0.429) (0.514) (1.276)
Procedural uncertainty 0.110* 0.119* 0.846***
(0.045) (0.051) (0.226)




IJV scope −0.001 −0.019 −0.031 −0.092 −0.673***
(0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.073) (0.180)
IJV size −0.079 −0.068 −0.074 −0.048 0.438*
(0.147) (0.138) (0.149) (0.148) (0.217)
Asset specificity −0.273* −0.178 −0.108 −0.105 −1.299***
(0.122) (0.139) (0.150) (0.199) (0.332)
Small numbers −1.019*** −1.174*** −1.306*** −1.633*** −7.220***
(0.257) (0.245) (0.267) (0.357) (2.036)
Market overlap −0.149* −0.165** −0.185*** −0.265*** −1.162***
(0.063) (0.062) (0.054) (0.077) (0.343)
JV duration 0.025 −0.013 0.141 0.237 3.206*
(0.396) (0.381) (0.347) (0.427) (1.383)
Environmental uncertainty 0.020 −0.032 −0.043 −0.094 −1.219**
(0.157) (0.171) (0.171) (0.190) (0.454)
Prior ties 0.784* 1.148** 1.165** 1.560*** 7.988**
(0.348) (0.366) (0.373) (0.370) (2.481)
Dyadic JV 0.278 0.253 0.346 0.710 7.812**
(0.417) (0.439) (0.459) (0.559) (2.683)
Cultural distance 0.117 0.287* 0.273* 0.306+ 0.269
(0.143) (0.137) (0.138) (0.183) (0.256)
Contract term specificity 0.187*** 0.197*** 0.164** 0.192** 0.834**
(0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.061) (0.266)
Partners' JV experience 0.372* 0.334* 0.452** 0.413* 2.157***
(0.152) (0.133) (0.144) (0.173) (0.555)
Host country rule of law 0.466* 0.390 0.587** 0.588* 5.763***
(0.207) (0.252) (0.212) (0.291) (1.560)
Shared parent and JV nationality −0.631 −0.632 −1.021+ −0.927 −2.886+
(0.555) (0.562) (0.588) (0.676) (1.506)
Same trading bloc −0.895 −0.524 −0.205 −0.544 −2.298*
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Table 2 presents the main findings of our analysis. In Model I, we show the control variables, and
we sequentially introduce our theoretical variables in Models II–Model IV. For discussion, we use
the results presented in the full model as shown in Model V. In our first hypothesis, we have argued
that differences in substantive and procedural law arising from different legal origins positively influ-
ence the choice of arbitration. In support of our arguments, the coefficient estimate of Different legal
families is positive and significant (p = .04). When covariates are held at observed sample values, we
find that the likelihood of finding arbitration provisions in IJV contracts increases by 17% on average
when partners do not share the same legal tradition. These results support the theoretical argument
about the increase in the likelihood of arbitration provisions when partners' home countries have
legal institutions originating from different legal traditions.
In Hypothesis 2, we predict that uncertainty arising from the procedures to follow for enforcing a
contract can encourage partners to employ arbitration. Consistent with this prediction, we find that
procedural uncertainty has a positive effect on the likelihood of arbitration provisions in the contract
(p < .001). Analysis of marginal effects reveals that an increase of procedural uncertainty by one
standard deviation from the mean leads to an increase in the probability of having arbitration provi-
sions in IJVs contracts by 31% (p < .001) on average with the other covariates held at observed sam-
ple values. These results support our argument that uncertainty caused by a large number of judicial
procedures will induce partners to seek recourse to private trilateral mechanisms in the form of
arbitration.
Our third hypothesis expects a positive relationship between litigation costs in IJV partners' home
countries and the likelihood of arbitration provisions in the contract. The results in Model V support
our expectation that the high cost of intervention through public institutions will make arbitration
more attractive (p < .001). Estimated marginal effects indicate that a one standard deviation increase
in court inefficiency from the mean will increase the likelihood of arbitration by 75% (p < .001) on
average with the other covariates held at observed sample values.
In our fourth hypothesis, we developed the argument that strong protection offered to share-
holders decreases the likelihood of arbitration provisions in the contract. The results in Model V indi-
cate a negative and significant coefficient (p < .001). The marginal effects analysis revealed that a
one standard deviation reduction in shareholder protection from the mean, the likelihood of arbitra-
tion increases by 46% (p < .001) with the other covariates held at observed sample values.
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.652) (0.565) (0.571) (0.683) (1.162)
Manufacturing sector −0.044 0.122 −0.021 0.243 3.887*
(0.406) (0.380) (0.438) (0.465) (1.557)
Services sector −1.007* −1.222** −1.276** −1.452** −1.361
(0.430) (0.444) (0.466) (0.515) (0.854)
Constant 1.939 1.806 −0.950 −2.888 −24.116***
(1.672) (1.687) (2.056) (2.733) (7.039)
Log likelihood −28.431 −25.817 −23.859 −22.372 −12.061
Chi squared 55.428 68.265 95.167 78.212 351.381
Note: N = 104. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10.
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Finally, some of the findings for the control variables in Model V are noteworthy. First, we find
that transaction characteristics that increase the scope for opportunistic behavior negatively impact
the likelihood of arbitration provisions in the contract. The negative and significant relationship
between asset specificity, small numbers as well as market overlap and arbitration can be explained
by the need for strong sanctions when facing the risk of opportunistic behavior (Drahozal & Hylton,
2003). Interestingly, these results tend to run against the argument according to which high risks for
hold-up situations magnify partners' inclination to favor remedies that promote exchange continuity
and compromising settlements (Bernstein, 2001; Macneil, 1962). In cross-country joint venture set-
tings, it appears that partners prefer the less conciliatory stance that is typical of public courts relative
to arbitrators when the risk of opportunistic behaviors is non-negligible (Drahozal & Ware, 2010).
As expected, the results for prior ties indicate a positive impact on the adoption of arbitration provi-
sions. Given that relational norms emerge with an increase in the number of prior ties, IJV partners
may value the arbitrators' awards that promote compromise, amicability, and continuity. We also find
that the coefficient for dyadic JV is positive and significant (p = .004). This result suggests that pri-
vate trilateral mechanisms are easier to design when consensus is not impeded by an increase in the
divergence of expectations with an increase in the number of partners.
4.1 | Supplementary analyses
Given our interest in investigating the choice of private ordering mechanisms, we have considered
the potential for the influence of institutional discrepancies on trilateral ordering through arbitration.
However, it is also possible that IJV partners turn to boards of directors for private and bilateral
ordering, so it is of interest to determine whether the institutional variables investigated above relate
uniquely to arbitration choice or whether they also pertain to choices regarding IJV boards. More
specifically, boards of directors in IJVs are statutory and serve as an important bilateral means to
address disputes surfacing at the highest organizational level (Klijn, Reuer, Van den Bosch, &
Volberda, 2013; Perkins, Morck, & Yeung, 2014; Reuer et al., 2014). Because boards monitor and
ratify decisions (Adams & Ferreira, 2007), they can also play a pivotal role in reconciling partners'
needs and interests (Kumar & Seth, 1998), resolving conflicts (Pisano, 1989), and promoting mutual
adjustment (Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006).
In order to disentangle the effects of the discrepancies among partners' home country legal institu-
tions on trilateral private ordering (i.e., arbitration) and bilateral private ordering (i.e., oversight pro-
vided by the boards of directors), we simultaneously estimate choices regarding arbitration and the
size of the board of directors. To do so, we used a conditional mixed process method
(e.g., Roodman, 2011). This method also enables us to account for possible interdependence between
those two governance-related choices. Our first dependent variable of interest, arbitration, is a binary
variable. The second dependent variable is a log transformation of the number of directors appointed
on the board (i.e., IJV board size). Results shown in Table 3 reveal that the level of shareholders pro-
tection in partners' home country positively influences IJV board size (p < .05), which is opposite to
the effect observed for arbitration provisions. Furthermore, we observe that the other institutional
variables—legal tradition, procedural uncertainty, and litigation costs—do not influence the size of
the board in IJVs. This finding is consistent with our overall endeavor aimed at primarily considering
the binary choice between trilateral public and private ordering. In other words, legal institutions
have an impact on the efficiency of trilateral public intervention and accordingly should influence
similar intervention privately through arbitration. However, we would not expect these same legal
institutional variables to shape the design of IJV board of directors, which is a qualitatively distinct
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TABLE 3 Results of bivariate estimation of arbitration provisions and size of JV board
Variables Arbitration Board size
Different legal families 2.614* −0.101
(1.154) (0.076)
Procedural uncertainty 0.845*** −0.012+
(0.213) (0.007)
Litigation costs 0.885*** −0.003
(0.230) (0.002)
Shareholder protection −5.187*** 0.070*
(1.413) (0.031)
International joint venture (IJV) scope −0.673*** −0.006
(0.179) (0.020)
IJV size 0.437* 0.029*
(0.193) (0.014)
Asset specificity −1.299*** −0.046
(0.331) (0.029)
Small numbers −7.208*** 0.032
(1.871) (0.039)
Market overlap −1.161*** −0.003
(0.317) (0.012)
JV duration 3.198** −0.052
(1.181) (0.085)
Environmental uncertainty −1.217** 0.017
(0.419) (0.030)
Prior ties 7.979*** 0.015
(2.305) (0.099)
Dyadic JV 7.797*** −0.154+
(2.320) (0.092)
Cultural distance 0.270 0.059+
(0.264) (0.030)
Contract term specificity 0.832*** 0.016*
(0.242) (0.008)
Partners' JV experience 2.156*** 0.082**
(0.531) (0.026)
Host country rule of law 5.756*** 0.023
(1.464) (0.047)
Shared parent and JV nationality −2.885+ 0.035
(1.498) (0.083)
Same trading bloc −2.293* −0.219*
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bilateral governance mechanism shaped by transactional considerations (Reuer, Klijn, van den
Bosch, & Volberda, 2011). The results shown in Table 3 below support this line of argument and
demonstrate the role of institutional characteristics in uniquely relating to arbitration as a dispute res-
olution mechanism for IJVs.
We also performed several supplemental analyses to examine the robustness of our results. Our
first set of robustness tests relate to the construction of the measures for the hypothesized variables of
interest. We characterize the institutional variation among partners by looking at their strength/weak-
ness. We also measure variation in legal institutions of partners by measuring our core explanatory
variables by employing differences in costs, procedures, and shareholder protection measures for
legal institutions in partner countries. We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use these alter-
native measures. As indicated above, we have obtained data from World Bank's Doing Business
database in order to develop measures for three of our four independent variables of interest
(i.e., procedural uncertainty, court inefficiency, and shareholders protection). While the Doing Busi-
ness database provides data starting in 2004, some of the IJVs in our sample were formed before
2004. Based on the premise that institutions remain rigid in the near term and hence do not experi-
ence much change, we employed values in the year 2008. As a robustness check, we have used
values from the year 2004 for IJVs which were formed in or before 2004. We note that we found lit-
tle to no variation in the values between 2004 and 2008, and use of the latter data yielded the same
interpretations.
Moreover, to account for any changes in institutional environments over time, we excluded from
our sample IJV deals that were negotiated before 1998 and obtained similar results. We also used
several alternative measures for shareholder protection such as the antidirector rights introduced by
Djankov et al. (2008). This measure assesses the protection of minority shareholders from conflicts
of interest and opportunism by insiders (Djankov et al., 2008; Klapper & Love, 2004). Our findings
remain consistent while using this measure as an alternative to the director liability index in our final
model (Model V). Finally, we tested the same set of models on a subsample that exclusively includes
IJV formed by two partners as it is more straightforward to account for differences in institutions
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Variables Arbitration Board size
(1.132) (0.086)
Manufacturing sector 3.880** −0.184*
(1.439) (0.089)








Note: N = 104. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10.
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across partners' countries for such collaborations. Findings reveal that our four hypotheses are
supported while considering a subsample of two-partner joint ventures.
5 | DISCUSSION
In this paper, we investigated whether and how the native institutional frameworks of partners influ-
ence the design of dispute resolution provisions in IJV contracts. We sought to clarify the institu-
tional antecedents of dispute resolution mechanisms in IJVs by joining ideas from new institutional
economics that suggest that the costs of economic exchange are often not trivial, and depend on the
transaction characteristics as well as the institutions that support exchange in different national econ-
omies (Coase, 1998; Williamson, 2000). International transactions come in a variety of forms, and
efficient design requires matching of transaction characteristics with governance attributes for pre-
serving order and continuity of the relationship (Williamson, 1979). We focused on legal institutions
because the ability of contracts to induce order depends mostly on the availability of a legal system
that facilitates defining and enforcing contracts (Williamson, 2000). To the extent that transactions
that span national boundaries require transacting parties to work under multiple legal systems,
designing governance mechanisms should take into account not only the transactional features but
also the costs of using the court systems to manage contracts and settle disputes (Pinkham & Peng,
2017). Legal institutional diversity among partners' home countries has an important impact on the
governance design of IJVs. We suggested that different institutional regimes of partners can under-
mine consensus and confidence in the functioning of the dispute settlement machinery and encourage
partners to opt for third parties in the form of arbitrators to support private ordering.
Our study contributes to alliance governance research by highlighting partner firms' anticipation
that possible disputes may not be resolved internally. Existing strategy research has extensively
acknowledged and examined the effects of conflicts on the stability and performance of alliances
(e.g., Killing, 1983), yet it has mostly focused its attention on internal mechanisms crafted for bilater-
ally dealing with conflicts (e.g., Steensma, Barden, Dhanaraj, Lyles, & Tihanyi, 2008). In the joint
venture context, in particular, the distribution of ownership and the allocation of controls have
received wide scrutiny from IB scholars (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006). In our study,
we account for the opportunity to design ex ante agreements in such a way that possible disputes
unresolved internally are settled by third parties. Choice between alternative trilateral orderings—
arbitration and public courts—has not received systematic research attention in the alliance gover-
nance literature.
Our study also contributes to IB research more generally that explores the impact of institutional
environments on MNEs and their expansion strategies. IB scholars have widely examined the effects
of institutional environments on the relative merits of various entry modes such as IJV, acquisitions,
and greenfield investments (Aguilera, 2011; Davidson & McFetridge, 1985; Gomes-Casseres, 1989;
Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Oxley, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Stevens & Makarius, 2015). We
extend this line of research by considering the effects of native institutional frameworks beyond the
decision to elect an entry mode in these broad terms. The present study offers a more fine-grained
investigation of the institutional environment and more particularly the legal institutions that bear
upon the microfoundations of the collaboration (Contractor & Reuer, 2014). By considering the dis-
pute resolution provisions per se, our study reveals that national institutions may not only impact
decisions related to bilateral mechanisms but also impact decisions related to trilateral mechanisms.
Beyond the fact that bilateral mechanisms function under the shadow casted by institutions, parties
may indeed seek alternatives at the legal institutional level in order to ensure the efficacy and
24 DEVARAKONDA ET AL.
credibility of their fall-back options. In line with Abdi and Aulakh (2012), our findings imply that
the efficacy of governance mechanisms is dependent on the ability of the underlying institutions to
credibly restore order.
We further contribute to the IB literature by showing how alliance partners make use of dispute
resolution mechanisms (a) for circumventing poor home-country institutional frameworks and (b) for
helping reduce misunderstanding derived from the differences between legal institutional environ-
ments of the partners. To begin with, countries involved in the IJV may not possess legal institutions
able to properly support the execution and enforcement of contracts (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). Firms
collaborating in such settings can in effect opt out of their national legal institutional settings by bor-
rowing private institutions (Pinkham & Peng, 2017). In this respect, our study shows that procedural
uncertainty, litigation costs, and poor shareholders' protection in IJV partners' home countries induce
them to opt for arbitration as a means of resolving conflict. In addition, our study also reveals that
legal institutional diversity among partners' home countries affects the governance design and mecha-
nisms of IJVs and in particular the arbitration choice. Consequently, institutional frameworks of part-
ners' countries are shown to be essential when it comes to considering institutional voids and
institutional borrowing.
Finally, our supplementary analysis concerning the influence of home-country legal institutions
and their disparities on IJV boards offers further contribution to IB and alliance-related research.
Although IJVs possess strong bilateral alignment mechanisms such as equity sharing and boards of
directors (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009), it appears that they may be more effective in addressing con-
cerns derived from transactional opportunism concerns, but are not particularly helpful in dealing
with institutional concerns. Future research can study, however, how arbitration can complement or
substitute for internal governance mechanisms aimed at dealing with conflicts. More specifically,
Hagedoorn and Hesen (2009) point out that firms may agree ex ante to bring disputes to an external
forum after failing to resolve them in an internal, predefined forum. Partners therefore anticipate
dealing with conflicts by sequentially escalating from private to public procedures.
6 | LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
A first limitation of our study is that we build on the challenges of interpretation and enforcement
presented by institutional differences for explaining the choice for arbitration. It is possible that the
nature of potential conflicts may greatly diverge following these two underlying mechanisms and it
is therefore interesting to see how partners achieve a match between the instrument to address con-
flict and the underlying mechanism causing the conflict. Future research could examine the pathways
in which interpretation and enforcement pose challenges and the specific remedies partners employ
to deal with such challenges. In addition, future research can consider the effectiveness of arbitration
as a tripartite mechanism to offer governance support to transactions and therefore enhance survival
and performance (Abdi & Aulakh, 2012; Chan, Isobe, & Makino, 2008).
Second, because our data originates in the SDC database, it inherits some of SDC's limitations.
We used SDC data as a starting point to identify the alliances formed by firms for conducting our
survey. To the extent that SDC's coverage of firms that fall outside the regulatory purview of
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), our coverage of Dutch IJVs may be restricted.
Our data also restricted us in studying details in arbitration clauses and future research may aim to
investigate differences among arbitration provisions (e.g., number of arbitrators, issues to be arbi-
trated, arbitral rules, and schedule and form of award). For instance, it would be interesting to explore
the choices by IJV partners between ad hoc or institutional forms of arbitration (Leeson, 2008; Mattli,
DEVARAKONDA ET AL. 25
2001). The ad hoc form is organized and administered independently of any arbitral institution. In
contrast, the institutional form takes place under the aegis of an arbitral institution, usually according
to the institution's own rules of arbitration. It may be useful to study the choice between an ad hoc
versus institutional arbitration to understand the extent to which dispute resolution mechanisms are
crafted to suit transactional and institutional characteristics. Besides the choice between ad hoc and
institutional arbitration, scholars may also shed more light on the detailed ways in which IJV partners
seek to handle disputes while accommodating their institutional differences.
Finally, it would be worthwhile to study the performance implications of the choice of dispute
resolution mechanisms and, more broadly, its consequences (e.g., duration of the IJV, tensions
avoided, conflicts resolve successfully, etc.). The objective of our research has been to investigate
the legal institutional antecedents of choosing arbitration. As a follow-up to our study, it would be
valuable to explore whether adequately aligning institutional discrepancies with dispute resolution
mechanisms at the formation phase contributes to governance efficiencies. It would also be interest-
ing to examine the actual choice made by IJV partners during the implementation of collaborations
between internal mechanisms, arbitration, and public courts when disputes actually occur. Even if
partners agree to opt for arbitration, they may switch to another remedy once disputes of particular
kinds arise, for instance. Future research should therefore jointly examine the choice for arbitration at
the formation phase, but also when it comes to dealing with disputes.
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